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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Ashley Andrews (“Andrews”) was convicted of one 
count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, four 
counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 
and 2, one count of program fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 666(a)(1)(B) and 2, one count of making a false claim 
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upon the Government of the Virgin Islands, in violation of 14 
V.I.C. § 843(4), and one count of inducing a conflict of 
interest, in violation of 3 V.I.C. §§ 1102, 1103, and 1107.  
Andrews appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence.  
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction, vacate the judgment of sentence on Counts One 
through Six, and remand to the District Court for 
resentencing. 
I. 
 In 1985, the Government of the Virgin Islands (“GVI”) 
and the United States entered into a consent decree in the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, pursuant to which the 
GVI was to make improvements to its sewage system.  For 
over fifteen years, the GVI failed to make the necessary 
repairs.  In October 2001, the District Court held a hearing, 
requiring the GVI to show cause why it should not be held in 
contempt for failure to comply with the consent decree.  
Around this time, Ohanio Harris (“Harris”), who, in his 
capacity as Special Assistant to the Governor of the Virgin 
Islands, was responsible for handling issues regarding the 
sewage system, began to promote Andrews as a contractor 
who could repair the sewage system.  Andrews had created a 
construction company called Global Resources Management 
(“GRM”) in 2001.  GRM, however, could not obtain the 
sewer repair contract without a Virgin Islands business 
license.  Because a “tax clearance” letter was required before 
such a license could be issued, and Andrews could not obtain 
a “tax clearance” letter on his own, when GRM applied for 
the license in late February 2002, Harris was listed as the 
president of GRM on the application.  Prior to February 2002, 
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Andrews had served as president of GRM, and on or about 
March 8, 2002, Andrews again replaced Harris as president of 
GRM. 
 On March 1, 2002, Harris and Andrews traveled to 
Tortola, British Virgin Islands to meet with representatives of 
the Berger Group, an American engineering firm.  At this 
meeting, Harris, who was introduced as the Special Assistant 
to the Governor, vouched for Andrews, stating that Andrews 
had organized local contractors to work as subcontractors for 
large firms.  Harris also indicated that he could arrange a 
meeting with the Governor to discuss awarding the sewage 
system contract to the Berger Group.  Harris testified that 
after this meeting, he and Andrews went to a hotel, and 
Andrews paid him $2,500 in cash.  The payment, Harris 
explained, was “for what [he] ha[d] done for [Andrews].”  
Harris deposited the check into his bank account and then 
used the money to make a mortgage payment on his home. 
 Around this time, Harris began to hold himself out as a 
liaison between GRM and Andrews, and the Virgin Islands 
Department of Public Works (“DPW”).  Harris arranged a 
meeting between the Governor and Andrews to discuss the 
sewer repair work.  After this meeting, Andrews asked Harris 
to help him get the contract, and Harris replied that he would 
“see what [he] c[ould] do.”  Harris testified that in exchange 
for his assistance in obtaining the contract, Andrews agreed 
that he would hire Harris to work at GRM after Harris retired 
from government service.  On March 24, 2002, Harris again 
traveled to Tortola to meet with Andrews and representatives 
from the Berger Group.  Harris testified that he told Andrews 
that he expected to be compensated for whatever assistance 
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he provided, and Andrews assured him that he would be paid.  
Harris subsequently set up additional meetings between 
Andrews, the Governor, and other GVI officials.  At some 
point, GRM submitted a $3.6 million bid for the sewer repair 
work.  The Governor testified that Harris told him “that 
[GRM] was a company that we should look at and see if they 
can do the job.”  The sewage system repair contract was not 
advertised, and there were no other contractors bidding for 
the project, despite the fact that, even in emergency 
situations, there were generally three bidders.  Wayne 
Callwood (“Callwood”), the Commissioner of DPW, testified 
that “[b]asically, this project was sole-sourced to GRM.” 
The GVI tentatively accepted GRM’s bid in October 
2002, on the condition that GRM procured a performance 
bond and a payment bond, each for 100 percent of the 
contract price ($3.6 million).  On October 7, Campbell 
Malone (“Malone”), a Certified Public Accountant acting on 
behalf of GRM, contacted Alan Feuerstein (“Feuerstein”), a 
New York attorney, for assistance in obtaining the bonds.  
Feuerstein put Malone in touch with Wayne Price (“Price”), a 
surety bond manager at Melwain Enterprises, in Long Island, 
New York.  On October 10, Price faxed Malone, who was in 
the Virgin Islands, a collection of bond application 
paperwork.  Price sent additional bond-related paperwork to 
Malone on October 11 (fax) and October 17 (email). 
On October 18, Malone emailed Price a completed 
bond application package, which was signed by Andrews.  
This application contained numerous false representations, 
including statements that:  (1) Andrews was divorced; 
(2) Andrews owned a home valued at $720,000, when, in 
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fact, his daughters owned the home; (3) Andrews had a one-
third interest in a $150,000 property located at 113 Estate 
Grove Place, St. Croix; (4) Andrews had $7,000 in cash on 
deposit at the Banco Popular as of September 30, 2002; and 
(5) Andrews had stock in GRM worth $600,000.  In the 
“work on hand” section of the application, which asked for a 
list of all of the contracts that GRM had secured but not yet 
completed, Malone and Andrews listed the following five 
“contracts” worth a total of $26 million:  (1) a professional 
services contract worth $1.5 million; (2) a contract with the 
GVI for sewage system repair in the amount of $7.5 million, 
twice the price of the actual contract; (3) a construction 
management services contract for Peebles Hospital in the 
British Virgin Islands valued at $1 million; (4) a development 
contract worth $12 million; and (5) “work on hand” for 
processing municipal garbage.  At trial, the Government 
proved that none of these contracts had been obtained.  
Additionally, the bond application falsely stated that:  
(1) GRM and its owners were not involved in any litigation, 
whereas Andrews was in the midst of a lawsuit related to 
another company that he owned; (2) GRM had a $350,000 
“investment” in an affiliate, which in reality was worthless; 
and (3) that Robert Jarnis was a director of GRM, when he 
actually worked for the Berger Group in Massachusetts. 
GRM had difficulty obtaining the bonds without a 
construction contract signed by the Governor.  Accordingly, 
the Virgin Islands Attorney General advised the Governor to 
sign the contract, on the condition that no Notice to Proceed 
would be issued by the Department of Property and 
Procurement (“P&P”) until GRM successfully obtained the 
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bonds.  The Governor signed the sewer system repair contract 
on December 20, 2002. 
On January 23, 2003, the United States filed a motion 
to enjoin the enforcement of the contract.  On January 28, 
before GRM was able to obtain the required bonds and before 
any Notice to Proceed was issued, the Governor terminated 
the contract.  The GVI subsequently asked the District Court 
to remove the injunction, but the District Court refused, and 
enjoined the GVI from re-contracting with GRM.  United 
States v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 248 F. Supp. 2d 420 (D.V.I. 
2003), affirmed in part and vacated in part by United States 
v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004). 
On June 12, 2003, Andrews submitted to the GVI a 
$748,304.92 post-termination claim, seeking payment for the 
time and resources GRM had expended preparing its bid.  
This claim included numerous false statements and duplicate 
charges.  Moreover, as evidence adduced at trial established, 
Andrews’s entire scheme was fraudulent.  Callwood testified 
that “to the best of [his] knowledge, [GRM was not] capable 
of doing construction work.” 
 Andrews, Harris, and Malone were indicted on 
February 20, 2004.  The grand jury returned a Second 
Superseding Indictment (“Second Superseding Indictment” or 
“Indictment”) on June 10, 2004, which charged Andrews with 
one count of conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 
(Count One), four counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and 2 (Counts Two through Five), one 
count of program fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 666(a)(1)(B) and 2 (Count Six), one count of fraudulent 
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claims upon the Government of the Virgin Islands, in 
violation of 14 V.I.C. § 843(4) (Count Seven), and one count 
of inducing a conflict of interest, in violation of 3 V.I.C. 
§§ 1102, 1103, and 1107 (Count Eight).  Harris pled guilty, 
and Malone and Andrews went to trial.  They were initially 
tried on the charges in the Second Superseding Indictment in 
May 2006, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict.  They 
were re-tried beginning in August 2006, and on September 
20, 2006, the jury convicted Andrews on all charges.  On 
January 19, 2011, the District Court sentenced Andrews to 
151 months’ imprisonment on Counts One through Six, to be 
followed by three years of supervised release.1  The District 
Court also imposed a $17,500 fine.  The District Court 
sentenced Andrews to two years’ imprisonment on Counts 
Seven and Eight, to be served concurrently with the sentence 
on Counts One through Six.  Andrews filed a timely notice of 
appeal.2
                                              
1 It is not clear from the record why nearly five years 
passed between Andrews’s conviction and the imposition of 
his sentence. 
 
2 Andrews first filed his notice of appeal on January 
26, 2011, but the District Court did not enter a written 
judgment until March 3, 2011.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2), we treat the notice of appeal as 
filed on the date that the District Court entered its judgment. 
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 On appeal, Andrews raises three arguments.  First, he 
argues that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Skilling v. 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010), the District Court’s 
instruction to the jury on honest services fraud under 18 
U.S.C. § 1346 was erroneous, and prejudice from the error 
spilled over to the other charges against him.  Second, he 
contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
convictions for wire fraud (Counts Two through Five), 
program fraud (Count Six), and inducing a conflict of interest 
(Count Eight).  Finally, Andrews maintains that the District 
Court improperly instructed the jury on Count Seven.3
                                                                                                     
In April 2011, Andrews filed a motion for release 
pending appeal, in which he argued that his appeal raised 
several substantial questions of law, likely to result in reversal 
of his conviction, a new trial, a noncustodial sentence, or a 
shorter term of imprisonment.  On September 6, 2011, the 
District Court denied his motion.  United States v. Andrews, 
No. 04-38-2, 2011 WL 3903229, at *5 (D.V.I. Sept. 6, 2011). 
 
3 The Government noted in its brief that the District 
Court erred in imposing a “general sentence” of 151 months’ 
imprisonment on Counts One through Six.  Andrews did not 
properly raise this issue in his opening brief, and ordinarily 
we would consider it waived.  United States v. Albertson, 645 
F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2005); see Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5); 
Third Circuit L.A.P. 28.1(a)(1).  However, because we 
believe that this case presents “extraordinary circumstances,” 
we will consider the legality of the sentence imposed by the 
District Court.  See Albertson, 645 F.3d at 195. 
 
10 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1612 and 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Where there were 
no legal grounds for challenging an instruction at the time it 
was given, but such grounds have arisen, due to the 
articulation of a new rule of law between the time of 
conviction and the time of appeal, we review for plain error.  
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 464-68 (1997); 
United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 305 
(3d Cir. 1997).  Accordingly, we review Andrews’s challenge 
to the honest services fraud portion of the jury instructions for 
plain error.  United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 321-22 (3d 
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Cir. 2010).4
                                              
4 The Government argues that Andrews waived his 
right to challenge the jury instructions on appeal because his 
attorney objected to the initial instruction and persuaded the 
District Court to provide a clarifying instruction.  Under the 
“invited error” doctrine, where a defendant makes a request in 
favor of certain instructions, he waives the right to complain 
of error in such instructions on appeal.  United States v. 
Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 97 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Console, 13 F.3d 641, 660 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, we have  
previously held that “[w]here a defendant submits proposed 
jury instructions in reliance on current law” and while his 
case is on direct appeal, the law is found to be constitutionally 
problematic, we will not apply the “invited error” doctrine.  
United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 305 
(3d Cir. 1997).  Instead, we review for plain error.  Id.  This is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s definition of waiver as 
the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right.”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
  We also review his challenge to the jury 
instruction on Count Seven for plain error.  Under plain error 
review, we may correct an error not raised at trial only if the 
appellant demonstrates that:  (1) there was an error; (2) the 
error is clear or obvious; and (3) “the error ‘affected the 
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case 
means’ it ‘affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings.’”  Id. at 322 (quoting United States v. Marcus, 
130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010)).  “If all three conditions are 
met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to 
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notice a forfeited error, but only if . . . the error seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the 
judicial proceedings.”  Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 (internal 
marks and citations omitted).  Andrews bears the burden of 
showing that the error affected his substantial rights.  United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). 
“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, we apply a particularly deferential standard of 
review.”  United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir. 
2008) (internal marks and citations omitted).  We must “view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government 
and sustain the verdict if any rational juror could have found 
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. 
(internal marks and citation omitted). 
III. 
A. 
 Andrews first contends that references to honest 
services fraud in the Second Superseding Indictment and in 
the District Court’s instructions to the jury constituted 
reversible error.  We disagree.  As we explain below, 
although Skilling rendered the jury instructions improper, the 
error did not affect Andrews’s substantial rights, and thus 
does not require reversal. 
 To prove wire fraud, the Government must establish 
“(1) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in a 
scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to 
defraud, and (3) the use of . . . interstate wire communications 
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in furtherance of the scheme.”  United States v. Antico, 275 
F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), abrogated on 
other grounds by Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 
(2010).  Under 18 U.S.C. § 1346, “the term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.”  In 
Skilling, the Supreme Court considered the scope and 
constitutionality of § 1346, and held that the statute 
criminalizes only “fraudulent schemes to deprive another of 
honest services through bribes or kickbacks.”  130 S. Ct. at 
2928, 2931.  The Court rejected an argument by the 
government that § 1346 also covers “undisclosed self-dealing 
by a public official . . . [such as] the taking of official action 
by the [official] that furthers his own undisclosed financial 
interests while purporting to act in the interests of those to 
whom he owes a fiduciary duty.”  Id. at 2932.  Such an 
interpretation, the Court explained, would render the statute 
unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 2931.  Accordingly, a district 
court’s failure to limit honest services fraud to schemes 
involving bribes or kickbacks now constitutes legal error.  
Riley, 621 F.3d at 323.5
                                              
5 Although Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 
(2010), was decided after Andrews’s trial and thus was 
unavailable to the District Court, we apply it retroactively.  
United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d 312, 320 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010); 
see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (“[A] new 
rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied 
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which 
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1. 
 The first step in our plain error analysis requires us to 
determine whether references to honest services fraud in the 
Indictment and in the District Court’s instructions constituted 
Skilling error.6
However, the Government emphasizes that the 
Indictment was redacted before the jury was charged, and all 
references to “honest services” in the wire fraud counts were 
  The Government concedes that the original 
version of the Indictment explicitly charged Andrews with 
honest services fraud.  The conspiracy count (Count One) 
alleged that Andrews “knowingly devise[d] a scheme and 
artifice to defraud and for obtaining money and property and 
to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.”  
The wire fraud counts (Counts Two through Five) alleged that 
Andrews “deprive[d] another of the intangible right of honest 
services” and “defraud[ed] the Virgin Islands government and 
its residents of honest services.”  The Government pursued 
both theories at trial, and in his closing argument, the 
prosecutor explained that the Government’s “alternative 
theory [was that] the scheme and artifice to defraud included 
the deprival of the Government and the people of the Virgin 
Islands of the honest services of Ohanio Harris.” 
                                                                                                     
the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”). 
6 Because Andrews was tried and convicted before 
Skilling, there is no dispute that no instruction was given 
limiting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to bribes and kickbacks. 
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removed.7
Although the District Court may have intended to 
narrow the Indictment to remove the honest services fraud 
theory, there were sufficient references to “honest services” in 
the redacted version of the Indictment and in the District 
Court’s jury instructions to lead a jury to believe that 
Andrews was charged with honest services fraud.  First, the 
“Introduction” section of the redacted Indictment stated that 
“Ohanio Harris had a duty to uphold the laws of the United 
States and the Virgin Islands; and to provide honest services 
  The Government further notes that the District 
Court charged the jury consistent with the redacted version of 
the Indictment; in explaining the elements of wire fraud to the 
jury, the District Court did not mention “honest services,” and 
stated that the first element of the wire fraud counts required 
proof “[t]hat the defendant knowingly devised or participated 
in a scheme to defraud, or to obtain money or property by 
materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises or omissions.” (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the 
Government argues that Andrews was charged only with 
tangible rights wire fraud, that is, a scheme or artifice to 
fraudulently obtain money or property from the GVI, and 
thus, there was no Skilling error.  We disagree. 
                                              
7 On September 15, 2006, the District Court asked the 
Government to provide a redacted copy of the Indictment, but 
it is unclear from the record why the honest services theory 
was removed.  The District Court told the jury simply that 
“[the Indictment] says ‘redacted’ on it.  That just means it’s 
something that I have done in order to make this read 
consistent with the evidence that’s in the box.” 
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to the people of the Virgin Islands.” (emphasis added).  
Although the Government removed references to “honest 
services” in the substantive portions of the conspiracy and 
wire fraud counts, after describing the basis for the wire fraud 
charges, the Indictment charged Andrews with the violation 
of § 1346, the honest services fraud statute, when it stated, 
“[a]ll in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 
1343, 1346 and 2.” (emphasis added).  Second, in its verbal 
charge to the jury, the District Court referred several times to 
“honest services” and “honest services fraud.”  During the 
introductory portion of the instruction, the District Court 
stated, “[t]he federal claims in this case . . . all relate to claims 
of fraudulent intent or attempts to corruptly deprive the 
Government of the Virgin Islands of the honest services of an 
officer or employee of the Government of the Virgin Islands.”  
When discussing the conspiracy charge, the District Court 
explained that “[t]he claim is that Ohanio Harris and Ashley 
Andrews conspired to commit honest services fraud or wire 
fraud and to corruptly solicit, give and accept a thing of value 
from an agent of the Virgin Islands Government.”  Several 
sentences later, the District Court reiterated that 
“the government has to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the conspiracy or the 
agreement or understanding described in the 
indictment, to commit honest services fraud or 
wire fraud, or to corruptly influence an agent of 
the Virgin Islands Government, was formed by 
two or more persons, and was existing at or 
about the time of the charge in the indictment.” 
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Although the District Court made the last two statements 
when discussing the conspiracy charge, a jury could certainly 
have understood them as references to Counts Two through 
Five, because the conspiracy count essentially charged the 
defendants with conspiracy to commit Counts Two through 
Five.8
 The Government points out that after Andrews’s 
attorney objected to language in the initial instruction, the 
District Court provided a clarifying instruction, explaining 
that the jury was obligated to consider the charges as they 
were presented in the Indictment.  Because the substantive 
allegations in the Indictment contained no references to 
honest services fraud, the Government contends, this 
additional instruction was sufficient to cure any error in the 
District Court’s previous instructions.  We disagree.  
Although a narrowing instruction may be sufficient to 
withdraw a previously-given instruction, see Whitney v. Horn, 
280 F.3d 240, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2002), the additional 
instruction provided here was not.  The District Court did not 
specifically address the honest services language that it had 
used, nor did it mention anything about removing 18 U.S.C. § 
1346, which was mentioned in the Indictment, from the jury’s 
  As such, we cannot agree with the Government that 
there was no Skilling error in this case. 
                                              
8 It is important to note that despite these references to 
honest services fraud in the conspiracy instructions, Andrews 
does not argue that Skilling invalidated his conspiracy 
conviction, at least not directly.  He does, however, raise a 
prejudicial spillover challenge to the conspiracy count, which 
we will address later. 
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consideration.  Rather, the District Court issued the clarifying 
instruction in response to an objection to its earlier instruction 
that “[w]hat must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
the defendant knowingly participated in the scheme to 
defraud, a scheme that is substantially the same as the one 
alleged in the indictment.”  Andrews’s counsel argued that 
the jury was required to find a scheme that was “exactly the 
same” as the scheme charged in the Indictment, not one that 
was “substantially the same.”  The District Court agreed that 
its language was potentially misleading, and re-instructed the 
jury as follows: 
“With respect to the wire fraud counts, I think I 
charged you that the government had the burden 
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
scheme existed as it was charged in the 
indictment, or a scheme that was substantially 
the same as that charged in the indictment.  And 
I think you’ll see the words ‘substantially the 
same,’ . . . in your instructions. . . .  You are 
instructed to disregard ‘substantially the same.’  
What has to be proven is the scheme alleged in 
the indictment. . . .  It is, as I told you, the 
government’s obligation to prove what is 
charged in the indictment in Counts 2 through 
5.  It is that simple.  The scheme there is to, as 
alleged, to defraud the Government of the 
Virgin Islands; not just a scheme, but a scheme 
to defraud the Government of the Virgin 
Islands, as charged in the indictment.” 
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Although this instruction clarified that the jury must 
consider only the scheme charged in the Indictment, the 
Indictment itself charged Andrews with violating 18 U.S.C. § 
1346, the honest services fraud statute.  Moreover, in the 
absence of an instruction specifically telling the jury to 
disregard all previous references to honest services fraud, we 
do not believe that the narrowing instruction provided by the 
District Court was sufficient to remove the taint of the 
previous instructions.9
2. 
 
 Having concluded that the first prong of the plain error 
test is met, we likewise conclude that the second prong is met.  
Although there was no plain error in the District Court’s 
instructions at the time of trial, the error became apparent 
when the Supreme Court in Skilling limited honest services 
fraud to bribes and kickbacks.  See United States v. Retos, 25 
F.3d 1220, 1230 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that an error is 
plain “where the error was unclear at the time of trial but 
                                              
9 We also note that the Presentence Investigation 
Report listed the statutes violated as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 
and 2 and stated that Andrews was charged with “knowingly 
devis[ing] a scheme and artifice to defraud and for obtaining 
money and property and to deprive another of the intangible 
right of honest services.”  Although this is not dispositive, 
and the Probation Officer certainly could have been mistaken 
as to what was ultimately charged in the redacted Indictment, 
it suggests that, at the very least, there was confusion as to 
whether Andrews was charged with honest services fraud. 
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becomes clear on appeal because the applicable law has been 
clarified” (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734)). 
3. 
 We turn now to the third step of our inquiry, which 
requires us to determine whether the error affected Andrews’s 
substantial rights, “which in the ordinary case means 
[whether] it affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings.”  Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164 (internal marks and 
citations omitted).  In other words, we must determine 
whether the error was harmless.  Id. (citing Olano, 507 U.S. 
at 734-35).  Under plain error review, a defendant bears the 
burden of demonstrating that the error was not harmless, i.e., 
that there is “a reasonable probability that the error affected 
the outcome of the trial.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.10
                                              
10 There is a narrow category of cases involving 
“structural errors,” which affect the “framework within which 
the trial proceeds.”  United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 
2164 (2010) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
468 (1997)).  The Supreme Court has left open the possibility 
that in cases involving “structural errors,” the defendant need 
not demonstrate that the error impacted the outcome of the 
trial.  Id. at 2164-65.  However, Skilling error is not 
“structural” and thus, Andrews bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the error was not harmless.  See Hedgpeth 
v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58 (2008) (per curiam) (holding that 
no “structural error” occurs where a jury is instructed on 
alternative theories of guilt, and the defendant alleges that the 
jury relied on an invalid theory); United States v. Skilling 
(Skilling II), 638 F.3d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 2011). 
  We 
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conclude that Andrews has not met that burden because:  
(1) he has not established a reasonable probability that he 
would have been acquitted of tangible wire fraud absent the 
Skilling error, and alternatively (2) he cannot demonstrate that 
the jury would not have convicted him of honest services 
fraud had it been instructed that the fraudulent scheme must 
involve bribery or kickbacks. 
 First, we find that, irrespective of the error, Andrews 
still would have been convicted of wire fraud (Counts Two 
through Five) on the valid theory of tangible rights fraud 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.11
                                              
11 Because the jury returned a general verdict, we 
cannot say definitively which of the Government’s theories 
the jury actually relied on to convict Andrews on Counts Two 
through Five. 
  Where there is a clear alternative 
theory of guilt, supported by overwhelming evidence, a 
defendant likely cannot show that an instruction permitting 
the jury to convict on an improper basis was not harmless 
error.  See United States v. Skilling (Skilling II), 638 F.3d 
480, 482 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Black (Black II), 
625 F.3d 386, 388, 392-94 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Hedgpeth 
v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008) (per curiam) (explaining 
that an instructional error may be harmless “so long as the 
error at issue does not categorically vitiate all the jury’s 
findings” and that “[a]n instructional error arising in the 
context of multiple theories of guilt no more vitiates all the 
jury’s findings than does omission or misstatement of an 
element of the offense when only one theory is submitted”) 
(internal marks and citations omitted).  In contrast, where 
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evidence on the valid alternative theory is relatively weak, the 
government relies heavily on the improper theory, and the 
district court’s instructions on the improper theory are 
“interwoven” throughout the jury charge, the instructional 
error will not be harmless.  See United States v. Wright, 665 
F.3d 560, 572 (3d Cir. 2012); Riley, 621 F.3d at 324; United 
States v. Hornsby, 666 F.3d 296, 305-07 (4th Cir. 2012).  In 
this case, the Government presented overwhelming evidence 
that Andrews committed tangible wire fraud and although the 
District Court referred to “honest services” on several 
occasions in its final instructions, the District Court did not 
define honest services fraud, nor were the references to 
“honest services” interwoven throughout the jury charge. 
Because the determination as to whether an 
instructional error was harmless depends significantly on the 
context in which the instruction was provided and the other 
evidence presented at trial, we will review in some detail the 
other cases that have addressed whether a Skilling error was 
harmless.  We first examine the cases in which courts have 
found Skilling instructional error to be harmless.  In Skilling, 
Skilling was charged with, among other things, conspiracy.  
130 S. Ct. at 2908.  The indictment alleged several possible 
objects of the conspiracy, including securities fraud and 
honest services fraud.  Id.  Although it held that the honest 
services theory was improper, the Court remanded to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to determine whether 
the error was harmless.  Id. at 2934.  In Skilling II, on remand, 
the Sixth Circuit held that the district court’s instruction that 
the jury could convict on either theory was harmless, even 
though the jury returned a general verdict on the conspiracy 
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charge without identifying the specific object of the 
conspiracy.  638 F.3d at 481, 483-84.  The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that because the evidence at trial overwhelmingly 
proved conspiracy to commit securities fraud, the verdict on 
the conspiracy charge would have been the same absent the 
erroneous instruction on honest services fraud.  Id. at 483-84, 
488.  The court also noted that the indictment “focused 
primarily” on securities fraud, and the government only 
mentioned the honest services theory in relation to Skilling 
once during its closing argument.  Id. at 483 & n.3.12
Similarly, in United States v. Black (Black II), 625 
F.3d at 392-93, on remand from the Supreme Court in Black 
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2963 (2010), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the district court’s 
Skilling error was partially harmless.  In that case, the 
defendants were charged with two counts of fraud.  Black II, 
625 F.3d at 388.  For both counts, the jury was instructed on 
two alternative theories:  (1) a scheme to fraudulently 
appropriate money from the company of which the 
defendants were executives (pecuniary fraud), and (2) a 
scheme to deprive the company of their “intangible right of 
honest services.”  Id.  The Seventh Circuit explained that 
although the honest services instruction was improper after 
Skilling, “if it [was] not open to reasonable doubt that a 
reasonable jury would have convicted [the defendants] of 
pecuniary fraud, the convictions on the fraud counts [would] 
 
                                              
12 The government did, however, rely heavily on the 
honest services theory in relation to Skilling’s co-defendant, 
Kenneth Lay.  Skilling II, 638 F.3d at 483. 
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stand.”  Id. (citations omitted).  The court explained that the 
evidence was sufficient to prove pecuniary fraud on both 
counts and the jury was correctly instructed on the elements 
of pecuniary fraud.  Id. at 391.  However, in light of the 
Skilling error, “the question [was] . . . whether a reasonable 
jury might have convicted the defendants of [honest services 
fraud] but not have convicted them of pecuniary fraud.”  Id. at 
392.  The Seventh Circuit reached a different answer to this 
question for each of the two counts based on the factual 
distinctions between the respective schemes to defraud.  As to 
the first count, the court found that the government made out 
“a solid honest-services case . . . but not a solid pecuniary-
fraud case,” and thus, it was impossible to say with certainty 
that the jury did not convict solely on the basis of the honest 
services theory.  Id.  However, the court upheld the 
defendants’ conviction on the second count, reasoning that 
“the evidence of pecuniary fraud [was] so compelling that no 
reasonable jury could have refused to convict [them] of it.”  
Id. at 393.  In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that 
the basis for the honest services fraud conviction was 
“mentioned in passing in the information, but the evidence at 
trial, and the closing arguments, focused on whether [certain 
acts were] merely an oversight or instead proof of pecuniary 
fraud.”  Id. 
 In contrast, in United States v. Riley, 621 F.3d at 324, 
United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d at 571, and United States v. 
Hornsby, 666 F.3d at 307, the improper honest services 
instructions were found to be reversible error.  In Riley, the 
defendants were charged with three counts of mail fraud 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2, based on a scheme to 
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fraudulently convey city-owned property, one count of 
program fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), stemming 
from the fraudulent sales of the property, and one count of 
conspiracy to defraud the public of a codefendant’s honest 
services, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346, and 371.  
621 F.3d at 317.  As an introduction to the conspiracy charge, 
the district court told the jury that “honest services . . . fraud 
does not require a scheme to defraud another to obtain money 
or property” and could instead be based on the violation of “a 
duty of honest, faithful and disinterested service to the public 
and that official’s public employer.”  Id. at 323 n.15.  The 
district court then explained that the jury could convict on the 
conspiracy charge if it found that the public official 
codefendant, Sharpe James, breached one or more of the 
following duties of honest services that he owed to the State 
of New Jersey and the City of Newark:13
                                              
13 James served as both the Mayor of Newark, New 
Jersey, and as a New Jersey State Senator.  Riley, 621 F.3d at 
318. 
  (1) “knowingly 
committing acts related to his official positions that were 
unauthorized exercises of his official functions for the 
purpose of obtaining and receiving money and benefits for 
himself and others from the governments that he 
represented”; (2) “as part of his fiduciary duty and his 
obligation pursuant to the circumstances set forth in [18 
U.S.C.] § 666(a)(1)(A), to refrain from stealing, taking by 
fraud, misapplying and misappropriating the assets of his 
public employers”; or (3) “as part of his fiduciary duty, to 
disclose conflicts of interest to his public employers in 
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official matters over which [he] exercised, and attempted to 
exercise, official authority and discretion, and to recuse 
himself where he had such conflicts of interest.”  Id. at 322. 
The government argued that because the first two 
alternative theories of duty were valid bases for finding a 
conspiracy, the district court’s improper instruction on the 
third basis did not affect the defendants’ substantial rights.  
Id. at 323-24.  We disagreed, reasoning that although the jury 
convicted James of a substantive violation referred to in one 
of the alternative descriptions of duty, program fraud under 
§ 666(a)(1)(A), the erroneous description of honest services 
fraud was at the “heart” of the conspiracy charge and 
“interwoven throughout the . . . charge.”  Id. at 324.  We 
further observed that “[t]he very title of [the conspiracy 
count], ‘Conspiracy to Use the U.S. Mail to Defraud the 
Public of Defendant James’s Honest Services,’ invite[d] the 
application of the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s charge to the jury 
regarding honest services fraud to the entire count.”  Id.  
Moreover, the conspiracy instructions “began with an over-
arching umbrella description of James’s fiduciary duty as a 
public official, which included the now-erroneous honest 
services definition.”  Id.  We also noted that the government 
focused on the non-disclosure of a conflict of interest and that 
the conflict-of-interest theory was “pervasive . . . throughout 
th[e] case.”  Id. at 324, 325.  Thus, we rejected the 
government’s argument that a jury would have viewed the 
three theories in the conspiracy instruction as alternative 
forms of conspiracy liability, separate and distinct from 
James’s violation of his honest services obligations, because 
the district court did not make such a distinction clear.  Id. at 
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324.  We concluded that the “defendants ha[d] met their 
burden of showing a reasonable probability that the jury 
utilized the broad definition of an honest services violation 
given in connection with the entire conspiracy charge.”  Id. 
We reached a similar conclusion in Wright.  In that 
case, the defendants were charged with honest services fraud, 
“traditional” mail fraud, and conspiracy.  665 F.3d at 564-65.  
The district court instructed the jury that it could convict for 
honest services fraud under either a “conflict of interest” 
theory or a “bribery” theory.  Id. at 567.  We held that the 
improper conflict-of-interest instruction was not harmless 
because there was “ample evidence on which the jury could 
have convicted [the defendants] under [the conflict of 
interest] theory” and “the evidence supporting the bribery 
theory, while sufficient, [was] less than . . . ‘overwhelming.’”  
Id. at 571 (citation omitted).  We explained that, based on the 
evidence, the jury may have drawn inferences about the 
defendants’ intent that would not support a bribery theory.  
Id.  We also noted that the “trial environment . . . emphasized 
the conflict-of-interest theory” and the jury instructions 
devoted “about eight times more words to the conflict-of-
interest theory than they did to the bribery theory.”  Id. at 572. 
Likewise, in Hornsby, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit held that a district court’s instruction that a 
jury could convict the defendant of honest services fraud on a 
conflict-of-interest theory was not harmless.  666 F.3d at 307.  
In instructing the jury on the honest services fraud counts, the 
district court explained that the jury need not consider 
whether the defendant received a financial benefit from a 
third party as part of the scheme to defraud; rather, the court 
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told the jury that it could convict if it found that the defendant 
“fail[ed] to disclose a personal interest in a matter over which 
[he had] decision-making power.”  Id. at 306.  The district 
court further stated that a “public official’s duty and honesty 
includes the duty to disclose . . . a personal conflict of 
interest” and that the “failure to disclose . . . may . . . 
constitute a fraudulent representation.”  Id.  In finding that the 
improper instruction was not harmless, the Fourth Circuit 
observed that the conflict-of-interest language was 
“interwoven” through the honest-services instruction.  Id. 
(citing Riley, 621 F.3d at 324).  Moreover, the court noted, 
the government presented strong evidence to support the 
conflict-of-interest theory and emphasized in its closing 
argument that “the defendant’s crime in this case is 
fraudulently participating in decisions where his business 
partner and his girlfriend had a stake and concealing it from 
the board.”  Id. at 306-07.  Thus, although the facts arguably 
showed that the defendant also received a kickback, based on 
the nature of the jury instructions and the emphasis placed on 
the conflict-of-interest theory, the Fourth Circuit held that it 
could not be certain whether the jury relied on a conflict-of-
interest theory or a kickbacks theory.  Id. at 307. 
Our case is distinguishable from those in which courts 
have determined that Skilling instructional error was not 
harmless.  First, as in Skilling II, 638 F.3d at 483-84, and 
Black II, 625 F.3d at 393, the Government presented 
overwhelming evidence of tangible rights (pecuniary) fraud.  
The testimony conclusively established that the object of 
Andrews’s fraudulent scheme was a tangible asset, that is, a 
multi-million dollar sewer repair contract from the GVI.  
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Although the evidence also showed a scheme to defraud the 
GVI of Harris’s honest services, the evidence of pecuniary 
fraud was so compelling that no reasonable jury could have 
refused to convict Andrews on that theory. 
Second, not only were the references to honest services 
fraud not “interwoven” throughout the jury charge, the 
District Court never explicitly instructed the jury on the 
elements of honest services fraud at all.  Cf. Hornsby, 666 
F.3d at 306; Riley, 621 F.3d at 324.  In contrast, the District 
Court did properly instruct the jury on the elements of 
tangible rights fraud.  In reference to Counts Two through 
Five, the District Court stated: 
“So the government has to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt three essential elements.  That 
the defendant knowingly devised or participated 
in a scheme to defraud, or to obtain money or 
property by materially false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises or 
omissions. . . .  So the first element the 
government has to prove . . . is that there was a 
scheme to defraud.  So the scheme to defraud is 
any deliberate plan of action or course of action 
by which someone intends to deceive or to 
cheat another, or by which someone intends to 
deprive another of something of value. . . . 
Federal law protects money and property 
interests.  Money or property interests are 
commonly referred to as tangible rights, 
because those are things that you can touch and 
feel.  They include, money, real property and 
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specific goods and property, goods or 
possessions.” 
The District Court further charged the jury that it was to 
consider only the scheme to defraud that was charged in the 
Indictment.  The description in Counts Two through Five of 
the Indictment of the “scheme to defraud” never mentions 
“honest services” or “honest services fraud.”  It does, 
however, set forth in detail Andrews’s scheme to fraudulently 
obtain the sewer repair contract, a tangible asset.  
Specifically, the Indictment alleges: 
“Beginning in or about December, 2000, and 
continuing up to at least the Fall of 2003, in St. 
Thomas and St. Croix, within the District of the 
Virgin Islands and elsewhere, the defendants 
Ashley Andrews, Campbell Malone, and others 
. . . devised a scheme and artifice to obtain 
money by means of material false and 
fraudulent pretenses and representations, 
omissions and concealment of material facts, 
which involved securing a no-bid contract for 
sewer repair work and generating a fraudulent 
claim for expenses incurred as a result of 
preparing a proposal for a contract to repair the 
St. Croix sewer system. . . . It was a part of the 
scheme and artifice to obtain money and 
property and to defraud the Virgin Islands 
government.” 
Moreover, in contrast to Riley, 621 F.3d at 324, the 
title of the challenged counts (Counts Two through Five) does 
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not mention “honest services.”  In fact, the title does not even 
cite § 1346, but refers only to § 1343; the title reads:  “Counts 
2 Through 5, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud).”  Thus, 
although the District Court referred to “honest services” three 
times in its final charge, the Indictment, which the jurors were 
explicitly instructed to follow, did not “invite[] the 
application” of the honest services language to Counts Two 
through Five.  Compare Riley, 621 F.3d at 324, with Skilling 
II, 638 F.3d at 483 n.3 (noting that the indictment “focused 
primarily” on securities fraud), and Black II, 625 F.3d at 393 
(stating that the basis for the honest services theory was 
mentioned in the information only “in passing”).14
                                              
14 The only language in the Indictment that could be 
interpreted as referring to honest services fraud was located in 
the “Introduction” section and stated:  “Ohanio Harris had a 
duty to uphold the laws of the United States and the Virgin 
Islands; and to provide honest services to the people of the 
Virgin Islands.” 
  
Furthermore, unlike in Riley, 621 F.3d at 324, where the 
improper conflict-of-interest theory went to the “heart” of the 
instructions, and Wright, 665 F.3d at 572, where the jury 
instructions devoted eight times more words to the improper 
theory, the District Court in this case made only a few passing 
references to “honest services” while discussing the 
conspiracy count.  Given that the District Court explicitly 
instructed the jury that it had to find the elements of tangible 
rights fraud beyond a reasonable doubt, and we presume that 
juries follow their instructions regarding a count in returning 
a verdict on that count, Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 
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713-14 (3d Cir. 2005), Andrews cannot establish a 
“reasonable probability,” Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164, that the 
passing references to “honest services” affected the jury’s 
verdict on Counts Two through Five.  Admittedly, the District 
Court’s statement that “[t]he federal claims in this case . . . all 
relate to claims of fraudulent intent or attempts to corruptly 
deprive the Government of the Virgin Islands of the honest 
services of an officer or employee of the Government of the 
Virgin Islands” is somewhat troubling.  However, in contrast 
to the “umbrella” statement in Riley, the District Court’s 
broad statement in this case was not followed by a further 
explanation of “honest services.”  Cf. Riley, 621 F.3d at 
324.15
                                              
15 It is worth noting that there is another difference 
between our case and United States v. Wright, 665 F.3d 560 
(3d Cir. 2012).  In Wright, the defendants objected to the 
honest services charge at trial and thus preserved the issue for 
review.  Id. at 570-71.  In such a situation, harmless error 
review requires the government to “prove[] beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.”  Id. at 570 (quoting United 
States v. Waller, 654 F.3d 430, 434 (3d Cir. 2011)).  In 
contrast, when we review for plain error, the defendant bears 
the burden of establishing that the error affected his 
substantial rights, which requires him to show that there is “a 
reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of 
the trial.”  Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.  Thus, Andrews faces a 
more difficult challenge in demonstrating reversible error 
than did the defendants in Wright. 
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Alternatively, even if Andrews could show that a 
reasonable jury might not have convicted him of tangible wire 
fraud absent the Skilling error, he still cannot demonstrate that 
the error affected his substantial rights because any 
reasonable jury would have found all of the elements of post-
Skilling honest services fraud beyond a reasonable doubt had 
it been instructed that the fraudulent scheme must involve 
bribery or kickbacks.  A district court’s failure to instruct the 
jury on an element of the offense will be harmless error if, 
based on the evidence, no reasonable jury could find that the 
element was not present.  Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 
18-19 (1999).  However, if the record contains “evidence that 
could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the 
omitted element,” the error is not harmless.  Id. at 19.  Here, 
although the jury was not instructed that § 1346 was limited 
to bribes and kickbacks, the Government proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the fraudulent scheme involved bribery. 
A bribery theory under § 1346 “requires a quid pro 
quo,” Wright, 665 F.3d at 567 (quoting United States v. 
Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 281 (3d Cir. 2007)), that is, “a specific 
intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for 
an official act,” id. at 567-68 (quoting United States v. Sun-
Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999)).  
“[A] bribery theory does not require that each quid, or item of 
value, be linked to a specific quo, or official act.  Rather, a 
bribe may come in the form of a ‘stream of benefits.’”  Id. at 
568 (quoting United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 240-41 
(3d Cir. 2011)).  An honest services fraud prosecution for 
bribery after Skilling thus requires the Government to prove:  
(1) that “the payor provided a benefit to a public official 
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intending that he w[ould] thereby take favorable official acts 
that he would not otherwise take,” and (2) that “the official 
accepted those benefits intending, in exchange for the 
benefits, to take official acts to benefit the payor.”  Id. 
(citations omitted).  “The quid pro quo can be implicit, that is, 
a conviction can occur if the Government shows that [the 
official] accepted payments or other consideration with the 
implied understanding that he would perform or not perform 
an act in his official capacity.”  Id. (quoting Antico, 275 F.3d 
at 257). 
Here, not only did the Government allege that 
Andrews committed bribery; the jury actually convicted him 
of bribery, albeit under a different statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a)(2).  Cf. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934 (stating that 
Skilling’s conduct did not violate the narrowed version of the 
statute because the government “did not, at any time, allege 
that Skilling solicited or accepted side payments from a third 
party in exchange for making . . . misrepresentations”).  We 
have never decided whether § 666(a)(2) requires proof of a 
quid pro quo, and therefore whether § 666 bribery is the same 
as § 1346 bribery.  See Bryant, 655 F.3d at 246 n.16.  
However, we need not decide that question today because the 
District Court’s jury instruction required the jury to find a 
quid pro quo exchange in this case.  At the close of trial, the 
District Court instructed the jury that as to Count Six: 
[t]he government has to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was action by 
Ashley Andrews to corruptly attempt to 
influence Ohanio Harris, knowing that he was 
an agent of the Government of the Virgin 
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Islands, for the purpose of causing him to use 
his position or abuse his position for the benefit 
of Ashley Andrews or GRM relative to 
obtaining the sewer contract. 
Thus, to convict Andrews on Count Six, the jury was required 
to find, as it would be under § 1346, that Andrews gave 
Harris a thing of value (the quid) in exchange for Harris 
performing acts in his official capacity favorable to Andrews 
and GRM related to the sewer repair contract (the quo).  
Given that the jury convicted Andrews on Count Six, no 
rational jury could have then failed to find that the fraudulent 
scheme alleged in Counts Two through Five involved bribery. 
 In sum, because Andrews has not shown a “reasonable 
probability that the [Skilling] error affected the outcome of 
the trial,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, we hold that there was no 
plain error as to Counts Two through Five.16
                                              
16 Because we find that Andrews has failed to satisfy 
the third prong of the plain error test, we need not consider 
the fourth prong, whether “the error seriously affect[ed] the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Riley, 621 F.3d at 322 (quoting Johnson, 520 
U.S. at 467). 
  We necessarily 
also conclude that there was no prejudicial spillover into the 
remaining counts.  “When two charges are closely linked and 
we vacate [or reverse] a conviction on one of them, we must 
ensure that the error on the vacated [or reversed] charge has 
not affected the remaining charge.”  Wright, 665 F.3d at 575.  
Here, because we have determined that the District Court’s 
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Skilling error was harmless (i.e., not prejudicial), see Marcus, 
130 S. Ct. at 2164, and thus did not require vacatur or reversal 
of Andrews’s convictions on Counts Two through Five, there 
was no prejudicial spillover to the remaining counts.17
B. 
 
 Andrews next argues that the evidence was insufficient 
to support his convictions for wire fraud, program fraud, and 
inducing a conflict of interest.  We will address his arguments 
as to each offense in turn. 
                                              
17 Given that our conclusion that the Skilling error was 
harmless was based, in part, on the fact that the jury convicted 
Andrews of bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), we 
acknowledge the potential for a circularity problem.  In some 
instances, it may be problematic to look to a defendant’s 
conviction on one count and conclude that an error as to 
another count was harmless, because there is the possibility 
that prejudice from the error spilled over and led to the 
conviction on the other count.  However, in this case, the 
Government presented such strong evidence that Andrews 
committed bribery under § 666(a)(2) that we do not hesitate 
to find that Andrews’s conviction on Count Six was wholly 
unaffected by the Skilling error.  See Black II, 625 F.3d at 390 
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that prejudice from the 
erroneous honest services instruction spilled over to an 
obstruction of justice count because the evidence of 
obstruction was “very strong” and “[n]o reasonable jury could 
have acquitted [the defendant] of obstruction if only it had not 
been instructed on honest-services fraud”). 
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1. 
 To obtain a conviction for wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1343, the Government must prove “(1) the defendant’s 
knowing and willful participation in a scheme or artifice to 
defraud, (2) with the specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use 
of . . . interstate wire communications in furtherance of the 
scheme.”  Antico, 275 F.3d at 261 (citation omitted).  Here, 
the Government presented sufficient evidence to allow a 
rational jury to find these elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Reyeros, 537 F.3d at 277.  Andrews’s contentions 
to the contrary are unavailing. 
 Andrews first alleges that the evidence on the wire 
fraud counts was insufficient because, although he asked 
Price to send bond documentation to Malone, he never asked 
Price to use interstate wire communications (i.e., fax or 
email).  However, the statute does not require that the 
defendant himself sent the communication or that he intended 
that interstate wire communications would be used.  Rather, § 
1343 requires that the defendant “knowingly caused” the use 
of interstate wire communications.  United States v. Bentz, 21 
F.3d 37, 40 (3d Cir. 1994).  “Where one does an act with 
knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the 
ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably 
be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he 
‘causes’ the mails to be used.”  Id. (quoting Pereira v. United 
States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954)); see United States v. 
Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941, 944 (3d Cir. 1980) (explaining that 
“cases construing the mail fraud statute are applicable to the 
wire fraud statute as well”). 
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 In this case, the use of interstate wire communications 
was reasonably foreseeable.  When Andrews asked Price, 
who was in New York, to send bond application documents to 
Malone, who was in the Virgin Islands, it was reasonably 
foreseeable that Price would send the documents via email or 
fax.  Moreover, given the complexity of the bond application 
process, it was reasonably foreseeable that Price and Malone 
would exchange multiple emails or faxes. 
 Andrews also contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction on Count Two 
specifically because the email transmission alleged in the 
Indictment never occurred.  Count Two of the indictment 
states that on October 10, 2002, Price sent an email to 
Malone.  The Government acknowledges that no email 
transmission occurred on this date; rather, as Price testified, 
the documents sent on October 10 were transmitted via fax.  
Andrews notes that fax and email are distinct means of 
communication, and argues that by allowing the Government 
to proceed on Count Two on the basis that Price sent a fax to 
Malone, the District Court “constructively amended” the 
Indictment.  We disagree. 
 “An indictment is constructively amended when 
evidence, arguments, or the district court’s jury instructions, 
effectively amends the indictment by broadening the possible 
bases for conviction from that which appeared in the 
indictment.”  United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (internal marks and citation omitted).  A 
constructive amendment constitutes a “per se” violation of a 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to a jury trial.  Id. 
(citation omitted).  In contrast, a variance occurs “when the 
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charging terms are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves 
facts materially different from those alleged in the 
indictment.”  Id. at 231 n.7 (internal marks and citation 
omitted).  “If a variance between the indictment and the 
evidence does not alter the elements of the offense charged, 
we will focus upon whether or not there has been prejudice to 
the defendant.”  Id. (internal marks and citations omitted). 
 Here, the discrepancy between the Indictment and the 
evidence presented at trial clearly constituted a variance.  See 
id.  The elements of wire fraud were unaffected; the 
Indictment simply misstated that the October 10, 2002 
transmission was made via email.  Andrews suffered no 
prejudice as a result of this minor variance. 
2. 
 Andrews also argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain his conviction on Count Six for program 
fraud.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), the Government must 
prove that the defendant (1) corruptly gave, offered, or agreed 
to give anything of value to any person, (2) “with intent to 
influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State, 
local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in 
connection with any business, transaction, or series of 
transactions of such organization, government, or agency 
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.”  Andrews 
challenges his conviction under § 666(a)(2) on the basis that 
the Government failed to demonstrate that Harris had the 
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authority to influence the award of the sewer contract.  This 
argument is meritless.18
 Harris, who qualified as an “agent” under § 666,
 
19
                                              
18 Andrews raises a similar challenge to his conviction 
for inducing a conflict of interest under 3 V.I.C. §§ 1102, 
1103, and 1107 (Count Eight).  We reject this challenge for 
similar reasons. 
 did 
not have to possess actual authority over the business, 
transaction, or series of transactions, that Andrews sought to 
influence.  See United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 323 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  Rather, the Government had to prove only that 
Andrews intended, by offering a bribe to Harris, to influence 
the sewer contract.  The Government presented sufficient 
evidence that Andrews possessed such an intent.  Moreover, 
even if actual ability to influence was required under § 666, 
Harris had the ability to influence the awarding of the sewer 
contract, as evidenced by the fact that he did exercise his 
influence and steer the sewer system repair contract to 
Andrews and GRM. 
19 Section 666 defines “agent” as “a person authorized 
to act on behalf of another person or a government and, in the 
case of an organization or government, includes a servant or 
employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and 
representative.”  18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(1). 
 
41 
3. 
 Andrews also contends that the Government failed to 
present sufficient evidence to prove Count Eight, inducing a 
conflict of interest.  Again, we disagree.  Section 1107 of 
Title 3 of the Virgin Islands Code provides that “[n]o person 
shall induce or seek to induce any territorial officer or 
employee to violate [3 V.I.C. § 1102(3)].”  Under 3 V.I.C. 
§ 1102(3): 
“[n]o territorial officer or employee shall . . . 
have any interest, financial or otherwise, direct 
or indirect, or engaged in any business or 
transaction or professional activity, or incur any 
obligation of any nature, which is in substantial 
conflict with the proper discharge of his duties 
in the public interest and of his responsibilities 
as prescribed in the laws of the Virgin Islands.” 
An officer or employee is deemed to have an interest “in 
substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties” 
under Virgin Islands law “if he will derive a direct monetary 
gain or suffer a direct monetary loss . . . by reason of his 
official activity.”  3 V.I.C. § 1103. 
The Indictment alleged that Andrews “caused Ohanio 
Harris to serve as president of GRM and act on behalf of 
GRM at a time when GRM sought contracts from Ohanio 
Harris’ employer, the [GVI].”  Andrews argues that because 
the Government did not show that GRM would make a profit, 
it did not prove that Harris “[would] derive monetary gain” 
from his activities, and therefore did not prove that he had an 
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interest “in substantial conflict” with his professional duties.  
To the extent that Andrews asks us to read a certainty-of-
monetary-gain requirement into the statute, we decline to do 
so.  In enacting Chapter 37, Conflicts of Interest, the Virgin 
Islands Legislature explained that the purpose of the statute 
was “to assure the impartiality, and ethical conduct of all 
involved in governmental transactions and decisions.”  3 
V.I.C. § 1100.  Accordingly, we hold that in a prosecution 
under 3 V.I.C. §§ 1102(3), 1103, and 1107, the Government 
need only prove that the “territorial officer or employee” 
expected to profit from the relationship such that his 
impartiality as a public official was likely to be affected.  
Here, Andrews and Harris entered into an arrangement, 
pursuant to which Harris would, in the future, derive 
economic benefit from GRM.  This expectation was sufficient 
to establish a conflict of interest under Virgin Islands law.  
The Government was not required to prove that GRM would 
be profitable in the future; in fact, we have difficulty 
envisioning how the Government would even go about doing 
so. 
C. 
 We turn now to Andrews’s final argument, that the 
jury was improperly instructed on Count Seven, which 
alleged fraudulent claims upon the GVI, in violation of 14 
V.I.C. § 843(4).  Section 843(4) makes it a crime for any 
individual to “make[] or use[] any false bill, receipt, voucher, 
roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit or deposition 
knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious 
statement or entry- in any matter within the jurisdiction of 
any officer, department, board, commission, or other agency 
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of the government of the Virgin Islands.”  Andrews argues 
that the District Court’s final charge to the jury was improper 
because it did not include a specific instruction that the jury 
must find the content of the claim false, and that the jury 
could not convict solely on the basis that Andrews had no 
contract with the GVI and thus no right to file a claim.  
However, on the first day of trial, the District Court gave 
precisely the instruction that Andrews argues was required.  
The District Court explained to the jury: 
“The Court has ruled that whether there was, in 
fact, legal authority to file the claim is 
irrelevant.  If one files a claim believing that 
there – even believing that there is a basis for 
filing a claim, one has the obligation not to file 
a false claim.  So the issue for the jury to 
determine, and as charged in the indictment, is 
whether or not the claim filed was false, and 
made with fraudulent intent.” 
Thus, the jury was clearly instructed that regardless of 
whether Andrews had entered into a valid contract with the 
GVI and had a right to file a claim for payment, an issue 
which was subject to dispute, the jury could only convict if it 
found that Andrews submitted a claim to the GVI, knowing 
that the claim contained false statements. 
 Andrews did not request that the District Court repeat 
this instruction during the final charge.  In its final 
instruction, the District Court stated: 
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“the government has to prove that there was a 
fraudulent claim submitted, that is, it was done 
for the purpose of trying to cheat the 
Government of the Virgin Islands, and that it 
was done not because of mistake or accident, 
not in good faith, but it was done with 
fraudulent intent.” 
Nothing in this instruction suggested to the jury that it could 
convict Andrews under 14 V.I.C. § 843(4) if it found that 
Andrews had no contract with the GVI and thus no right to 
file a claim.  Because we presume that the jury followed the 
initial instruction, United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 171 
(3d Cir. 2011), we conclude that the District Court committed 
no error in instructing the jury on Count Seven. 
IV. 
 Finally, we address the legality of the sentence 
imposed by the District Court.  The Government noted in its 
brief that the District Court erred in imposing a “general 
sentence” on Counts One through Six, instead of specifying 
an individual sentence for each offense.  Andrews did not 
properly raise this issue in his opening brief, and ordinarily 
“an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his 
opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”  
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citations omitted).  However, the waiver rule yields in 
“extraordinary circumstances.”  United States v. Albertson, 
645 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011).  In determining whether a 
case presents “extraordinary circumstances,” we consider 
three factors:  (1) “whether there is some excuse for the 
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[appellant’s] failure to raise the issue in the opening brief”; 
(2) the extent to which the opposing party would be 
prejudiced by our considering the issue; and (3) “whether 
failure to consider the argument would lead to a miscarriage 
of justice or undermine confidence in the judicial system.”  
Id. (quoting In re Kane, 254 F.3d 325, 331 (1st Cir. 2001)).  
The miscarriage of justice factor is “somewhat similar to the 
‘plain error’ rule,” which allows appellate courts to correct an 
error not raised before the district court if the error affected 
the defendant’s substantial rights and “seriously affect[ed] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Id. at 196 (quoting Gambino v. Morris, 134 
F.3d 156, 169 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (Roth, J., concurring), and 
United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 Applying these factors to Andrews’s case, we believe 
“the balance weighs in favor of reviewing the merits” of the 
general sentence issue.  Id. at 195.  With respect to the first 
factor, Andrews has provided no compelling reason for his 
failure to raise the issue in his opening brief.  Thus, the first 
factor weighs in favor of waiver.  However, the second and 
third factors weigh heavily against waiver.  As to the second 
factor, it is clear that the Government would suffer no 
prejudice as a result of our considering the issue because the 
Government expressly concedes in its brief that remand for 
“clarification of the sentence” on Counts One through Six is 
appropriate.  Finally, as to the miscarriage of justice factor, 
we have held, in the context of plain error review, that a 
general sentence error under the Sentencing Guidelines 
affects a defendant’s “substantial rights and result[s] in 
manifest injustice because, as a result of the general nature of 
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the sentence, neither we nor [the defendant] can determine 
whether it was legal as to particular counts.”  United States v. 
Ward, 626 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
 Turning to the merits, we hold that the District Court 
erred in imposing a general sentence of 151 months’ 
imprisonment on Counts One through Six.  Under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, a district court must impose a 
sentence on each count.  Ward, 626 F.3d at 184 (citing 
U.S.S.G. 5G1.2(b)).  Here, although the 151-month term of 
imprisonment was within the statutory maximum for Counts 
Two through Five, it exceeded the statutory maximum for 
Counts One and Six, and due to the general nature of the 
sentence, we cannot determine whether the sentence was legal 
as to each count.  See id.  Therefore, we will vacate 
Andrews’s sentence on Counts One through Six, and remand 
for the limited purpose of allowing the District Court to 
clarify the sentence imposed on each count of conviction. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of conviction, vacate the judgment of 
sentence on Counts One through Six, and remand to the 
District Court for resentencing. 
